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It is the obligation and burden of the employee to supply
proof for both the legal and medical causation tests.

The

employee has not satisfied either test.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has previously held that in workers1 compensation
proceedings commencing after January 1, 1988 that the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act applies.2 Accordingly, if the
confusing order on review of the Industrial Commission held that
the Allen

test did not need to be met by the employee, the

employer urges that this Court apply the rationale set forth in
Points I and II of the employer's original brief and hold that
the applicant had to meet its burden under both the legal
causation and the medical causation tests of

Allen.

Because there is only medical causation testimony as to a
one-time lift of 28 pounds, the Court should look no further than
this one incident for legal causation and should find that
neither the medical or the legal causation test of Allen was met.
Finally, the record is absolutely clear that any waiver by
the employer as to the medical causation issue pertained only to
the one-time lift of luggage and nothing else.

Once the

employee's theory of the case became clear, the employer, by its
conduct at the time of the hearing withdrew any stipulation
regarding medical causation.

Grace Drilling
App. 1989).

v. Board of Review,
- 2 -
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Because the proceedings in the instant case were commenced
long after January 1, 1988#6 the UAPA applies in construing the
Industrial Commission's Order on Motion for Review.
The employer urges the Court to hold, as does the employee,
that the effect and meaning of the Order of the Industrial
Commission was merely to affirm the A.L.J, that the employee's
back problems were due, in part, to his pre-existing back
condition.

If the Court determines this is the effect of the

Order of the Commission, then only the issues raised in Points
III through VI of the employer's original brief need be
considered.

II.

THE EMPLOYEE FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IN
SHOWING EITHER LEGAL CAUSATION OR MEDICAL CAUSATION.
The claimant has the burden to prove that his injury is

compensable.7 Although the employee in his fact statement goes
into great detail about the strenuous nature of his travel
activities and how this aspect of his employment added
significantly to the risk he faced for back injury, there is no
medical testimony stating that in fact these activities caused or
contributed to the employee's herniated discs. And if the travel
6

6, 1989.

The employee's Application for Hearing was filed March
See Record (R.) 8.

7

Allen v. Industrial
Commission,
729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah
1986), Sabo's Electronic
Service
v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah
1982); Redmond Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial
Commission,
454
P.2d 283 (Utah 1969); Jensen v. U.S. Fuel Co., 424 P.2d 440 (Utah
1967); Wherritt
v. Industrial
Commission,
110 P.2d 374 (Utah
1941).
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Under the medical cause test, the claimant must sho^ 1: y
evidence, opinion or otherwise that the stress, strain
or exertion required by his or her occupation led to
the resulting injury or disability. In the event the
claimant cannot show a medical causation connection,
compensation should be denied. (Emphasis added,)
Stated somewhat differently i i i this court's recent decision
in Nyrehn

i

Commission:9

1 ndustrial

The Ut ah Supreme Court held in .Allen that a cl aimant
must supply proof of both "legal" and "medical"
causation. "Under the legal test, the law must defs-ie
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of '^risin:.
out of the employment 1 . . . [the] doctors must say
whether the exertion (having been held legally
sufficient to support compensation) in fact caused this
finjury] 1U {Emphasis added.)
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Therefore, although apparently the legal causation standard
may be determined by the finder of fact, only "doctors must say
whether the exertion in fact caused this [injury].11

The doctor

in this case refused to link the injury to employee's travel
activities in two responses11 and linked it only to the one-time
lift of 28 pounds.
Allen

This surely cannot be unusual exertion since

specifically states that the lifting of luggage is part of

the "typical activities and exertions expected of men and women
in the latter part of the twentieth century."
A case very similar to the one at bar is Chadwick
Industrial

Commission.™

v.

There, the hospital employee claimed

that he had contracted an eye infection related to his
employment.

In language virtually identical to the language used

by the treating physician in the instant case who provided the
only medical evidence on causation, the medical panel in Chadwick
stated:
The fact that the hospital environment provides a much
greater exposure to all types of infections would
suggest that the applicant's eye problems could be
traced to his employment.13 (Emphasis added.)
The A.L.J, in that case, as he should have done in this
case, declined to award benefits because he could not determine
with reasonable certainty that the employee's eye condition was
caused as a result of his employment.

The Court went on to note

R. 156-157, R. 356.
572 P.2d 400 (Utah 1977)
Id.

at 401.
- 6 -

(Chadwick).

that the burden of proof is upon the employee to establish his
entitlement to benefits and show medical causation.

In upholding

the denial of benefits the Utah Supreme Court concluded:
Plaintiff's argument that the medical panel report to
the effect that there was a comparatively high risk of
infection in his employment and that there therefore
existed the possibility that his eye infection could
have come from that source is not entirely without
plausibility. However, the mere fact that it could
have come from that source or even that there is some
likelihood that it did so, does not compel a finding
that that was the fact. . . In order for this court to
overturn the commission's refusal to grant plaintiff an
award on the evidence herein, we would have to depart
from the field of proper review and enter that of
probability or conjecture, . . . . u (Emphasis added.)
This is exactly what has happened in the instant case.

The

Industrial Commission departed from the proper standard of proof
as to medical causation and awarded benefits based on conjecture.
On two separate occasions the specific question was put to Dr.
Rich as to whether the traveling of the employee caused the
injury.

In both instances, Dr. Rich declined to state that it

did and merely said that it "can" or "could."15

This is

insufficient to support a finding of medical causation as to the
employee's travel schedule.

Therefore, given the total and utter

lack of evidence regarding medical causation to a degree of
reasonable certainty, the A.L.J, as well as the Commission erred
in finding medical causation for anything other than the onetime lift of 28 pounds, which one-time lift did not meet

Id.

at 402.

R. 156-157, R. 356.
- 7 -

Allen's

legal causation standard requiring unusual exertion or increased
risk of injury above what a worker normally faces in everyday
life.

III. THE EMPLOYER'S ATTORNEY OBJECTED TO AND NEVER STIPULATED TO
TRAVEL OR TRAVEL FATIGUE AS A FACTOR IN MEDICAL CAUSATION.
HIS STIPULATION EXTENDED ONLY TO THE 28 POUND LIFT OF
LUGGAGE.
The employer's attorney initially stipulated that there was
no medical causation issue, but this stipulation pertained only
to the lifting episode on May 6, 1988, when the employee lifted
28 pounds.

This stipulation did not include travel fatigue or

any other activity.

The allegation of how the accident occurred

according to the employee's Application for Hearing is as
follows:
While involved in business travel for my employer, was
waiting in airport. Was attempting to move to escape
heavy tobacco smoke from people around me. As jerked
baggage computer equipment to change seats, felt sudden
pull and strain in lower back area. It became
progressively more painful causing me to seek medical
help a few days later.16
The record is replete with counsel's withdrawal of any
stipulation to medical causation beyond the one-time baggage
lifting incident.

Counsel objected to testimony beyond the

employee's initial allegations of the scope of this accident and
thereby withdrew any stipulation based on other facts presented
at the time of hearing before the A.L.J.

R. 8-9.
- 8 -

It is true that the employer took the deposition of the
employee prior to the date of the hearing, but contrary to the
A.L.J.'s instructions17 it was never filed with the Industrial
Commission and is not available as part of the record.
At the time of the hearing when claimant testified regarding
his travel schedule, defense counsel immediately objected as
follows:
MR. WHITE: Your Honor, I would object to this line of
questioning, and the reason is, the Application for
Hearing says that we had an accident on the 6th day of
May, that there was one incident and it goes on to two
pages. And here we have all this extraneous
information about all the other activities. I have
never previously seen a claim that this contributed to
the problem and I think we have a notice problem here
if we are going to claim that this caused it here for
the first time in this hearing.18 (Emphasis added.)
When claimant's counsel attempted to introduce exhibits
regarding travel, defendant's counsel objected as follows:
THE COURT: These have been marked as Exhibit A-2. Mr.
White, do you have any objections?
MR. WHITE: Well, yes. I will object again because I
think it's not relevant. We are talking about a May
6th accident and here we are introducing all this stuff
which is really not material — not relevant.19
(Emphasis added.)
This was a continuation to the objection previously noted
regarding notice and the new theory that travel medically caused
or contributed to the employee's injury.

R. 27-29.
R. 42, lines 12-21.
R. 45, lines 2-8.
- 9 -

The A.L.J, overruled

the objection of the employer and his ruling was sustained by the
Industrial Commission when the issue was raised on review.
In closing argument, defense counsel once again raised the
medical causation and notice issues by arguing as follows:
MR. WHITE: How may I please the Court? [sic]
[Incorrect transcription, this should be: Now, may it
please the Court] Your Honor, now only after hearing
the evidence, I have determined not only is there a
legal causation problem here, there is also a medical
causation problem. We know from Allen and its
following cases, that both prongs of the test must be
met, and I want to speak to both of them.
MR. DEWSNUP: Your Honor, I would object to that. He
has already conceded there wasn't a medical causation
question, so I didn't emphasize it in the evidence.
THE COURT: At the beginning of the hearing, I asked
you if there was a medical causation problem and you
indicated —
MR. WHITE: Well, that's before I heard the evidence,
Your Honor. I got this report just today [referring to
the report of J. Charles Rich] and I would like to
speak to that and —
THE COURT: Well, let me — well, let me finish, Mr.
White. At the beginning, I asked, under the Allen
case, if we had any issue on legal causation and you
said, no, the only issue is legal. Strike that. If we
had any problems with medical causation and you said,
no.
MR. WHITE: Well, if I may also point out, I objected
to the testimony on this other information because the
only evidence I had when I got here this morning was
that there was an allegation that this pertained to the
May 6th incident. I get in here and now — and that's
in the claim, that's in the Application for Hearing,
that was at the time of the deposition and now I get in
here, after I made that representation, and hear new
evidence, which I objected to and so I think, since
evidence as to another causation other than what was
alleged, other than which I had notice of at the outset
of this hearing, I should —
THE COURT:

Which —
- 10 -

MR. WHITE: Well, particularly this travel. I had
never heard — that the sole allegation, as I pointed
out in the Application for Hearing, is that the May 6th
incident caused this problem and now Mr. Dewsnup comes
in here and opens up a new theory and says that all
this travel caused this. That these long trips — Now,
that's the first I have heard about this. And so I
think I should certainly be able to respond to that and
I think there is definitely a medical causation
question when it comes to those allegations that the
trip and the travel and the moving here and in and out
of the hotel and all this business, caused the problem
which he is complaining of.20 (Emphasis added.)
The stipulation as to medical causation pertained only to
the 28 pound lift on May 6, 1988. There was no stipulation as to
employee's travel schedule satisfying the medical causation
standard and any stipulation regarding medical causation was
withdrawn.
Furthermore, the failure to allow the employer to dispute
medical causation when the theory of accident as contained in the
Application for Hearing changed to a broader theory of accident
would result in surprise and a denial of due process denying the
employer the right to respond.

This right is guaranteed under

the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and
the Utah State Constitution, Article 1, Section 7.

In light of

the conduct of employer's counsel subsequent to the applicant's
theory of accident and legal and medical causation coming fully
to light, and the fact that Dr. Rich's first letter was first

R. 87-89.
- 11 -

produced on the date of the hearing before the A.L.J.,

the

employer should be permitted to dispute both legal and medical
causation.

CONCLUSION
For the purposes of construing the meaning of the order of
the Industrial Commission, the employer urges that the employee's
interpretation of the meaning of that order he adopted and that
the order of the Commission on Review he interpreted to affirm
the findings and conclusions of the A.L.J., notwithstanding
inconsistent language within the order.

If this is the case, it

is only necessary to look to Points III through VI of the
employer's original brief on appeal. However, there can be no
doubt that the Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure apply to
the order of the Industrial Commission.

If the order does not

simply affirm the A.L.J., whose findings and conclusions were
based on a construction of the Allen test, then it should be
overturned and construed to be consistent with the A.L.J.'s order
for purposes of appeal.
As far as the legal and medical causation issues are
concerned, there is no medical evidence to support the conclusion
that any work activity other than the one-time 28 pound lift on
May 6, 1988 caused claimant's disc herniations.
lift does not satisfy the Allen

test requiring unusual exertion

or additional risk in the workplace.
21

Moreover, this

R. 87, lines 17-29.
- 12 -

Finally, employer's counsel did not stipulate regarding
medical causation except as to the one-time, 28 pound lift since
this is the only work activity that the employee's Application
for Hearing referred to. Any stipulation regarding causation and
the employee's travel was withdrawn as evidenced by the repeated
objections and statements of counsel at the time of the hearing.
Even if it weren't withdrawn, it would be error to uphold
benefits in the face of insufficient medical proof.

Fundamental

fairness and due process require that counsel not be prevented
from arguing a defense when plaintiff's theory finally becomes
clear.
Based on the foregoing, the employer urges this Court to
reverse the Industrial Commission's order and deny benefits on
the grounds that (1) the employee did not satisfy the burden of
proof as to medical causation to a degree of reasonable medical
certainty, and (2) that employee's single lift of luggage which
was followed by a sudden onset of back pain requiring surgery was
not unusual exertion.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

Larry R.l White
Attorney! for PlaintiffAppellant (Employer)
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